Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation
About
This talk will introduce the area of mechanism design, and then focus on the problem of bilateral trade. Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years, primarily for the private values case. This talks will focus on welfare maximization in bilateral trade with interdependent values. Designing mechanisms for interdependent settings is much more challenging because the values of the players depend on the private information of others, requiring complex belief updates and strategic inference. Based on Interdependent Bilateral Trade: Information vs Approximation (EC25).
Speaker
Thodoris Tsilivis
Thodoris is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Computing and Data Sciences at Boston University, working with professor Kira Goldner. Prior to coming to BU, he received his joint BSc and MSc in Electrical and Computer Engineering at the National Technical University of Athens. Thodoris is broadly interested in anything related to computer science theory. His current research interest lies in algorithmic game theory, mechanism design, and randomized algorithms.