Guaranteed Speech
About
I will discuss a strategic scenario inspired by the misinformation problem. A decision maker receives advice from an informed source. But, the source's incentives may may be misaligned with the decision maker. When the source has the option to guarantee their message, this may improve the situation for the decision maker. Technically, the model is a combination of cheap talk and costly signaling, analyzed for strategic equilibrium with commitment power (stackelberg).
Speaker
Tejovan Parker
Tejovan is interested in using computation and the complex system perspective to understand how to better manage multi-agent, or socio-economic, systems. He is working with Marshall Van Alystyne, Xuezhou Zhang, and Francisco Marmolejo-Cossío to investigate simple economic mechanisms to improve equilibrium behaviors in partially-observed stochastic games with imperfect incentive alignments.
Tejovan began his PhD studies at BU in September 2022. Prior to this he studied Mechanical and Global Engineering at the University of Colorado Boulder.